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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-2270 
_____________ 
 
PURANDHAR DHITAL; SHANTI DHITAL; 
ASMITA DHITAL; AYUSH DHITAL, 
  Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                     Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A098 903 113, A098 903 114, A098 903 115 & A098 903 116) 
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Rosalind K. Malloy 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
January 25, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge*
 Petitioners, Purandhar Dhital ("Dhital"), his wife Shanti Dhital, and their two 
children, Asmita Dhital and Ayush Dhital, seek review of a Bureau of Immigration 
 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 05, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Appeals ("BIA") order affirming the immigration judge's ("IJ") ruling that they are not 
entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against 
Torture ("CAT").  We deny their petitions, for the reasons set forth below.   
I. 
  Because we write for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent necessary 
for resolution of the issues raised on appeal.  Dhital entered the United States from his 
native country of Nepal sometime around September 1, 1997 on a student visa.  His 
family followed shortly after.  Ultimately, the Dhitals' visas were set to expire on 
December 18, 2004.  They filed petitions for asylum, withholding of removal and 
protection under the CAT on January 18, 2005.  Hearings on their petitions were 
conducted on September 14, 2006 and November 28, 2008. 
 Dhital testified that he was afraid to return to Nepal for several reasons.  First, he 
testified that ongoing conflict between Maoist guerillas and the Nepalese government 
makes Nepal a violent and unstable place to live.  Second, in November 2004, Dhital's 
brother—who lives in Nepal—received a letter, addressed to Dhital, threatening violence 
against Dhital unless he gave a Maoist leader 25 lakhs, which is equal to approximately 
$34,000.  Third, Dhital testified that the Maoists might be targeting him because of his 
past membership in the United Marxist Leninists ("UML")—an organization promoting, 
among other things, democracy, women's rights and social services—or because of his 
past membership in Nepal's University Teacher's Association ("NUTA").  He also stated 
that university-educated friends and colleagues associated with the West had been 
harmed upon their return to Nepal. 
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 The IJ recognized that the Maoists are a violent terrorist organization that has 
created strife for the Nepalese government and its citizens.  Nevertheless, the IJ 
concluded that Dhital was not eligible for relief because (1) there was no evidence that 
Maoists had persecuted Dhital in the past; (2) there was no evidence that Maoists were 
targeting the "western educated," only evidence that they had targeted individuals with 
wealth; (3) there was no evidence that Dhital was targeted because of his membership, 
over a decade ago, in the UML or the NUTA; (4) the extortion letter Dhital's brother 
received was sent seven years after Dhital left Nepal—just a few months before he 
applied to remain in the United States—even though the Maoists were active in Nepal 
before 1997; (5) there was no follow-up or harm as a result of the failure to comply with 
the extortion letter; and (6) Dhital's oldest son returned to Nepal in March 2004 and, just 
like Dhital's brother, has not been harmed.   
The IJ also found that Dhital's testimony about the extortion letter was not entirely 
credible because of variations in the story about the extortion letter, its timing, and the 
fact that the authors of the letter never followed through on their promise to demand more 
money if the initial amount was not paid.  According to the IJ, Dhital's fears of 
persecution were purely speculative.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  To qualify for asylum, the 
petitioners must show that they are “unable or unwilling to return to [Nepal] . . . because 
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 
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1101(a)(42); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).  A petitioner's failure to demonstrate 
eligibility for asylum necessarily means that he failed to meet the higher burden of proof 
for statutory withholding of removal.  See Mudric v. Attorney General, 469 F.3d 94, 102 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).  For relief under the CAT, the petitioners must demonstrate that it is 
more likely than not that they would be tortured if removed to Nepal.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(2); see also Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180, 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). 
Because the BIA’s original final order of removal summarily affirmed the IJ, we 
review the IJ's decision directly.  Mudric, 469 F.3d at 101.  Our review of the IJ's 
decision is for substantial evidence, considering whether it is “supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Lin-Zheng v. 
Attorney General, 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal citation omitted).  
Adverse credibility determinations are reviewed under the same standard, and must be 
upheld "unless 'any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.'" Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).   
III. 
 Dhital argues that the IJ's ruling is not supported by reasonable, substantial and 
probative evidence.  We disagree.  Dhital's generalized fears of violence in Nepal are not 
enough to obtain asylum.  See Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 740 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing that "harm resulting from country-wide civil strife is not persecution on 
'account of' any enumerated statutory factor").  Nor is his speculation that he might be 
targeted because of his education and stay in the United States.  The IJ concluded that the 
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evidence demonstrated, at most, that Maoists are targeting people of means, not the 
"western educated."  The wealthy are not a protected class.  Neither are the "western 
educated."  And even if the western educated are a protected class, the IJ's conclusion that 
Dhital was not targeted because of his membership in such a class is supported by 
substantial evidence. (See, e.g., Admin. Rec. at 161 (Dhital referring to attack on student 
as "crookery") and 192 (Dhital admitting that he ignored the extortion letter at first 
because "there may be some crooks in the community . . .")).   
The IJ's conclusion that Dhital does not have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution also finds substantial support in the evidence.  Dhital's son returned to Nepal 
without suffering harm, no harm has come to pass as a result of the extortion letter, and 
Dhital's brother has not been the target of violence. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen family members remain in [the] petitioner’s native country 
without meeting harm, and there is no individualized showing that petitioner would be 
singled out for persecution, the reasonableness of a petitioner’s well-founded fear of 
future persecution is diminished.”).  Moreover, we cannot conclude that "any reasonable 
adjudicator" would be compelled to find Dhital's extortion-letter-related testimony to be 
credible.  The IJ found that it was not credible and we uphold that determination. 
Dhital's contention that he is entitled to relief under the CAT fares no better.1
                                              
1 The government argues that Dhital waived this issue by not presenting it to the BIA.  We conclude that he did.  
(Admin. Rec. at 37 (noting that Dhital sought relief under the CAT)). 
  
There is no evidence that Dhital has been tortured or would be tortured upon his return.  
The extortion letter does not threaten torture.  Dhital speculated that he might be subject 
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to generalized violence upon his return to Nepal.  But this, too, does not constitute 
torture.  And even if it did, the CAT requires that the torture be inflicted “by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).  There is no evidence that public 
officials might torture Dhital.  In short, we find no reason to disturb the IJ's ruling on 
Dhital's CAT claim. 
IV. 
 The IJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.  For the foregoing 
reasons, we deny the petitions for review.  
